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Abstract 
Using the IFC investable measure to designate firms as either investable or non-investable prior to cross-
listing, I show that Level 2/3 cross-listing firms that were previously non-investable enjoy the largest 
“cross-listing premia”. Since previously non-investable firms are likely to experience the largest increase in 
their shareholder base post-listing, the results are consistent with the notion that enhanced “recognition” 
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1. Introduction 
 Firms from emerging market countries have increasingly come to dominate the international 
cross-listing market. To illustrate this point, consider the following. In 2010, more than 36% or 794 of the 
total international depositary receipt programs were from Brazil, Russia, India, and China (The so-called 
BRIC Countries). India (315), Russia (179), and then China (159) provided the greatest number of 
international cross-listing firms, followed by Brazil (141) in fourth. Contrast this with the corresponding 
figures from 2006, when the top three positions were occupied by India (234), followed by the United 
Kingdom (146), and Australia (119). In turn, this changing of the guard, so to speak, has come as no 
surprise, since in recent years much of the growth in the international cross-listing market has come from 
firms from emerging market countries.1 For example, in 2006, BRIC countries provided half of the new 
depositary receipt programs (Bank of New York, 2007). This number increased to 58% (93 out of a total 
number of 160 cross-listings) in 2007, 48% (49/102) in 2008, and 55% (57/104) in 2009 (Bank of New 
York, 2008, 2009, 2010). In 2010, almost 53% (80/151) of new listings originated from China (37), India 
(31), and Brazil (12) collectively (see Bank of New York, 2011). Furthermore, the surge in new listings 
from emerging markets is not concentrated in any one-host market.2 Of the 26 new international cross-
listings on the NYSE in 2010, Chinese firms accounted for 22 or 85% of these, and all but 4 of 34 new 
international listings in Luxembourg were from India (Bank of New York, 2011). 3 Finally, the ascension 
of emerging market countries to the position as the top providers of international cross-listing firms has 
also come about because once listed, these firms are less likely to cross-delist (Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 
2009).4 Thus the influx of new lists and the apparent satisfaction experienced by those already cross-listed, 
together suggests that international cross-listings should generate large benefits for these firms, which 
ultimately should enhance their value. In fact, recent work suggests that this is in fact the case. For 
example, Lins et al. (2005) shows that cross-listing in the U.S. alleviates financing constraints for emerging 
                                                 
1 But for a blip in 2009, the number of international depositary receipts has increased steadily since 2002. The major 
growth has taken place in the global depositary receipt (GDR) market (Bank of New York, 2011). For example, in 
2008, nearly 55% of new depositary receipt programs were GDRs (Bank of New York, 2009).     
2 Despite the popularity of cross-listing for emerging market firms, Siegel (2009) finds that for Mexican firms, 
strategic alliances provide greater bonding benefits than do Level 2/3 cross-listings in the U.S. 
3 Russia (2), Spain and Germany accounted for the other 4.   
4 Piotroski and Srinivasan (2008) identify a small number of large high quality firms from emerging markets who 
cross-list on U.S. exchanges post 2002, despite the additional costs imposed by SOX.   
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market firms, resulting in enhanced externally-financed growth (Khurana et al., 2008)).5 In turn, O’Connor 
(2009a) and Smirnova (2008) both document cross-listing premia (Doidge et al., 2004, 2009) for emerging 
market firms cross-listing in the U.S. as Level 2/3 ADRs.6 However, neither of these before mentioned 
studies, nor some others, seeks to identify the sources of these valuation gains. This paper attempts to fill 
this void.   
 To do so, I focus on two, albeit non-mutually exclusive hypotheses, namely the legal bonding 
hypothesis (Coffee, 1999, 2002; Stulz, 1999; Doidge et al., 2004), and Merton’s (1987) recognition 
hypothesis.7  Recent evidence suggests that both explain the valuation gains from international cross-
listings (see Doidge et al., 2004, 2009; and King and Segal, 2009 who relate the cross-listing premium to 
legal bonding, and Foerster and Karolyi, 1999, and King and Segal, 2009 for evidence relating investor 
recognition and the joint effects of recognition and legal bonding on cross-listing premia, respectively), 
although their relative importance differs across firms. In their study of single- and dual-class Canadian 
firms cross-listing in the U.S., King and Segal (2009) show that dual-class share firms enjoy permanent 
cross-listing premia irrespective of whether they attract and maintain a larger shareholder base. For these 
firms, bonding to the U.S. regulatory regime is sufficient to generate a cross-listing premium. These 
findings are in line with the predictions of the legal bonding hypothesis (Doidge et al. 2004). In contrast, 
single-class share firms only experience permanent cross-listing premia if they can attract and maintain a 
wider shareholder base.8 For these firms, since the bonding gains are likely to be minimal, cross-listing 
premia are determined by changes in the firms shareholder base; the greater the expanse of the 
shareholder base, the greater the cross-listing premia. In this paper, I examine whether either of these 
hypotheses, either individually, or collectively, can explain cross-listing premia for emerging market firms.   
                                                 
5 Khurana et al. (2008) do not examine emerging market firms separately, but do show that the gains from cross-
listing do not differ by level of financial development. Thus the growth effects uncovered for the full sample of firms 
apply also to emerging market firms.  
6 Interestingly, using a sample of cross-listing firms from Central Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland) and 
Russia, Smirnova (2008) uncovers a cross-listing premium for all depositary receipt types, with surprisingly, non-
exchange traded issues (Level 1 and Rule 144a) enjoying larger premia than exchange-traded (Level 2/3) firms. Using 
a larger sample of emerging market firms cross-listing in the U.S.; O’Connor (2009a) finds a cross-listing premium 
for Level 2/3 ADRs only.   
7 For a review of the legal bonding hypothesis see Benos and Weisbach (2004), Ferris et al. (2009), and Karolyi 
(2010).    
8 In turn, single-class share firms who can do so experience much larger percentage changes in value relative to dual-
class firms (King and Mittoo, 2007, Figure 6). 
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 I begin by first establishing the existence of cross-listing premia for emerging market firms who 
choose a Level 2/3 listing in the U.S. In subsequent tests, I show that these cross-listing premia are a 
function of both enhanced recognition and bonding, but in my tests of the latter, I reveal some mixed 
findings. Specifically, when I classify cross-listing firms as either single- or dual-class share firms, I find no 
discernible differences in their cross-listing premia. Cross-listing serves to endow both with a cross-listing 
premium, and inconsistent with the predictions of the legal bonding hypothesis, dual-class share firms do 
not enjoy a larger cross-listing premium than single-class share firms. However, when I classify cross-
listing firms by pre-listing levels of insider ownership, I find in favour of the bonding hypothesis. Less 
well-governed firms (i.e. firms with below-median closely held shares as a % of total common shares 
outstanding) enjoy larger cross-listing premia. Better-governed firms do not.   
 I then proceed to examine the effects of investor recognition on cross-listing premia. My paper is 
most closely related to that of King and Segal (2009), but differs to theirs in a number of crucial respects, 
namely in terms of the methodological approach and in terms of the findings. First, my test of the 
Merton’s (1987) investor recognition hypothesis is different to theirs. Since cross-listing firms that were 
previously “unrecognized” to U.S. investors are more likely to reap that largest expansion of their 
shareholder base once they cross-list (Merton, 1987), I use the investable measure from the IFC to classify 
cross-listing firms as previously “recognized” and “unrecognized”. Since investable (non-investable) firms 
are already likely to be known (unknown) to U.S. investors (Holland and Warnock, 2003; and Edison and 
Warnock, 2004), investable (non-investable) firms are likely to experience modest (large) expanses in their 
shareholder base once they cross-list. In turn, and all else equal, previously non-investable firms should 
experience a larger cross-listing premium than previously investable firms. This is what I find; previously 
non-investable and investable Level 2/3 firms witness cross-listing premia, but the premium is larger for 
previously non-investable firms, a result in line with the predictions of the recognition hypothesis. In turn, 
I show that these findings are robust to several distinct approaches used to measure the effect of cross-
listing on firm value, namely firm fixed-effects, pooled ordinary least squares (with and without Mundlak 
(1978) corrections for unobserved heterogeneity), random effects, and Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions. 
Each approach points to a cross-listing premium for previously non-investable firms and a smaller 
premium for previously investable firms. My results are in line with the predictions of Merton’s (1987) 
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recognition hypothesis, and consistent with the findings of King and Segal (2009). However, my paper 
differs to that of King and Segal (2009) in how I examine the influence of investor recognition on the 
cross-listing premium. In their paper, they relate post-listing changes in a firm’s shareholder base to greater 
recognition; firms that experience the largest post-listing change in their shareholder base are, they suggest, 
likely to be those firms that investors were previously “unaware” of prior to firms cross-listing. In this 
paper, I use a different measure, which allows me to explicitly classify between firms that investors are 
likely to be, and unlikely to be aware of once they cross-list. In doing so I am then able to identify two sets 
of firms, namely those for which investors are likely to be “aware” of (i.e. previously investable firms), and 
“unaware” of (i.e. previously non-investable firms) just as I am able to do so when I test the predictions of 
the bonding hypothesis by distinguishing between single- and dual-class share firms, as King and Segal 
(2009) also do. Using this measure, I find evidence to support Merton’s (1987) recognition hypothesis. 
Previously non-investable Level 2/3 firms enjoy much larger cross-listing premia than do previously 
investable firms.   
 Next, using this approach to test for the effects of enhanced recognition on cross-listing premia 
greatly simplifies the analysis needed to test the joint effects of investor recognition and legal bonding on 
cross-listing premia. To do so, I just re-estimate the investor recognition regressions, but now for single- 
and dual-class firms alone, and for cross-listing firms with above- and below-median closely held shares 
(as a % of total common shares outstanding). When I do so, I find that previously non-investable firms 
enjoy the largest cross-listing premia. For them, the combination of enhanced recognition and legal 
bonding leads to large cross-listing premia. In summary, these findings suggest that previously non-
investable firms, whom are likely to experience a sizable expansion of their shareholder base, witness the 
largest cross-listing premia. Using alternate proxies for investor recognition, Foerster and Karolyi (1999) 
and King and Segal (2009) find likewise.9  
 Finally, I document cross-listing premia for single- and dual-class share Level 2/3 ADRs, 
irrespective of their prior investable status. In contrast to their Canadian counterparts, I find that bonding 
alone is sufficient to generate cross-listing premia for single-class share emerging market firms who trade 
as Level 2/3 ADRs in the U.S. For these firms, the gains from bonding in the U.S. appear larger than for 
                                                 
9 As do Fresard and Salva (2010). They show that the “cross-listing discount” between cross-listing and U.S. firms is 
smaller if cross-listing firms can attract U.S. institutional investors.     
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their Canadian counterparts. For dual-class share emerging market firms, the gains are no greater than for 
single-class share firms. When I classify cross-listing firms by level of insider ownership, I reveal cross-
listing premia for poorly-governed firms, irrespective of their prior investable status. For these firms, again 
I find that bonding alone to delivers cross-listing premia. In summary, I find that bonding alone is 
sufficient for Level 2/3 firms to enjoy cross-listing premia. However, legal bonding combined with greater 
recognition deliver the largest cross-listing premia.          
 The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I describe the data. Section 3 presents some 
regression estimates and a discussion of the findings. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Data Description and Summary Statistics 
 I begin by sourcing a complete list of emerging market firms that have cross-listed in the U.S. 
over the period from 1980 to 2007. All information on cross-listed firms is sourced from the Bank of 
New York, and cross-referenced with information from Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan, the New York Stock 
Exchange, and NASDAQ. I take great care in order to identify a firm’s initial listing. To do so, I consult 
the historical records from the Bank of New York (since the currently available on-line records refer to a 
firm’s current - not previous/initial cross-listing). I cross-reference this data with the cross-listing database 
provided by Citibank. They flag firms that have changed their cross-listing status by including a “successor 
depositary receipt” data type for all firms. Once I have identified these firms, I am able to identify their 
initial listing in the U.S. Using both databases, firms are classified as either, a Level 1 over-the-counter; 
Level 2 and 3 exchange-traded; or Rule 144a listings that trade on Portal to Qualified Institutional 
Buyers.10 For inclusion in my sample, I require that firms have (financial) data available in both the pre- 
and post-listing periods.    
 To this list of firms, I seek to identify all firms that became investable in emerging markets over 
the same period. To do so, I use the “investable” measure provided by the IFC’s Emerging Markets 
Database (EMDB). I use this measure to try and identify “recognized” and “unrecognized” firms a la 
Merton (1987). His theory, applied to international cross-listings, suggests that all else equal, cross-listing 
                                                 
10 I group Level 2 and 3 firms together because separately the number of each is small. Most cross-listing studies 
tend to adopt the same approach (although not always due to sample size considerations). Bancel et al. (2009) do 
examine Level 2 and Level 3 European ADRs separately.    
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serves to enhance the visibility of firms. Institutional investors “recognize” and become more “aware” of 
firms, and in particular, firms that they were previously not aware of, once these firms cross-list. Thus, to 
test this proposition, the difficulty lies in trying to identify “recognized” and “unrecognized” firms.11 To 
do so, I use the investable measure. This firm-specific measure of equity market liberalizations, as 
opposed to the all-encompassing country-specific measures (Bekeart et al., 2005), allows me to classify 
cross-listing firms into those that were previously investable as a result of stock market liberalizations (and 
not cross-listings), and thus potentially known to foreign investors prior to cross-listing, and those 
previously non-investable (their investable status arises out of cross-listing and not stock market 
liberalizations), and thus potentially not known to investors prior to cross-listing.12 Country-specific 
measures by their very nature prevent me from performing such an exercise. The recognition hypothesis 
then suggests that, all else equal, firms that experience the greatest level of “recognition” upon listing 
should witness the largest cross-listing premium. Institutional investors are likely to be already aware of 
“investable” firms, and less “aware” of “non-investable” firms.13 Recent evidence suggests this is the case. 
For example, Holland and Warnock (2003) and Edison and Warnock (2004) both show that U.S. investors 
do invest in “investable” firms.14 Non-investable firms remain “unrecognized”. Thus, I conjecture that 
once “non-investable” firm’s cross-list; they are likely to experience the largest increase in their 
                                                 
11 Others adopt different approaches. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) proxy for Merton’s (1987) ‘shadow cost of 
incomplete information’. Merton (1987) extends the CAPM and (positively) relates the expected return of a firm to 
its shareholder base (and other factors). He shows that the size of a firm’s shareholder base is inversely related to 
what he refers to as the firms ‘shadow cost of incomplete information’. The greater the ‘shadow cost of incomplete 
information’ the less “recognized” or more “neglected” firms are. Consequently, actions which tend to reduce firms 
‘shadow cost of incomplete information’ e.g., cross-listing, lowers expected returns, and increases firm value. In turn, 
firms with the greatest change in the ‘shadow cost of incomplete information’, i.e., previously “unrecognized” firms, 
should experience the largest gains from cross listing. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) show that this is in fact the case, 
thus lending support to the recognition hypothesis. King and Segal (2009) proxy for the extent of investor 
recognition by using two proxies which they suggest are likely to be highly correlated with investor’s awareness of 
the stock, namely the number of U.S. institutional investors holding the stock, and the proportional ownership by 
U.S. institutional investors of the stock.  
12 One notable shortcoming of these investable measures is that their use in this context is also likely to pick up some 
market segmentation effects (Bris et al., 2007). Since a cross-listing is likely to be the first liberalization event for 
non-investable firms, they are likely to experience a decrease in segmentation once they cross-list. The non-investable 
dummy is thus likely to pick up both the effects of segmentation and greater recognition. Foerster and Karolyi 
(1999) and Bris et al. (2007) examine the effects of market segmentation on the value of cross-listing firms.      
13 A possibility is that firms become indirectly investable, and thus known to investors via country funds. In the 
empirical analysis, I include country-fund data, and find that my results are qualitatively unchanged.  
14 Of course, not all investable firms are likely to be equally attractive to foreign investors. Consistent with a large 
literature, which shows that institutional investors prefer well-governed firms (McCahery et al., 2009; Bushee et al., 
2007; Ferreira and Matos, 2008), Bae and Goyal (2010) show that well-governed Korean firms experience the 
greatest stock price increases and physical capital accumulation rates post equity market liberalization in Korea.    
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shareholderbase. Thus, relative to previously investable firms, these firms should experience the largest 
increase in their shareholderbase, and thus all else equal, the largest cross-listing premia.15  
 Like Mitton (2006) and Mitton and O’Connor (2011), I measure the openness of a firm’s stock to 
foreign investors using the “investable” measure provided by the EMDB.16 The IFC designates a firm as 
investable if its stock is free from both country-level and firm-level restrictions on foreign investment. 
They also require that stocks have sufficient size and liquidity to be realistically available to foreign 
investors. I define a firm as investable in a given year if the firm’s stock appears in the IFC investable 
index by December of that year.17 From this sample of investable firms, I identify all cross-listed firms 
that were deemed investable, not as a result of cross-listing, but previously (prior to cross-listing) as a 
result of stock market liberalizations. In my final sample, what I term joint ‘investable/cross-listing’ firms 
are cross-listing firms that were initially deemed investable as a result of stock market liberalizations. Non-
investable/cross-listing firms become investable through cross-listing alone.     
 Next, I test the legal bonding hypothesis in this emerging market setting using two different 
measures to gauge the strength of corporate governance for cross-listing firms. First, and like King and 
Segal (2009), I examining the differing effect of cross-listing on single- and dual-class share firms. Dual-
class share firms tend to be quite prominent in emerging markets (Lins, 2003; Claessens et al., 2002), and 
since, agency costs are likely to be greater in dual-class share firms; the legal bonding hypothesis then 
suggests that exchange cross-listing in the U.S. should generate the greatest gains for these firms.18 I 
designate firms as either single- or dual-class share firms using the ‘Currently a Multiple Share Company’ 
indicator from Worldscope, which they define as “Currently a multiple share company indicates which 
companies currently have more than one type of common/ordinary share”.19   
                                                 
15 Greater recognition also results in greater analyst following once firm’s cross-list. Lang et al. (2003) relate the 
cross-listing premium to greater analyst following.    
16 Others that use these investable measures include Mitton (2006), Mitton and O’Connor (2011), Bae et al. (2004), 
Flavin and O’Connor (2010), and Bae et al. (2010).      
17 As noted in Edison and Warnock (2003), there are limitations to using these measures. However, like Mitton and 
O’Connor (2011), I don’t believe that they introduce any significant biases in the tests performed in this paper. 
18 However, recent evidence suggests that firms who conceivable should gain the most from exchange cross-listing 
don’t do so, not because they don’t gain from cross-listing, but rather because the costs (e.g., of U.S. GAAP 
compliance) is greatest for these firms (Hope et al., 2007). The net effect (i.e., benefits less costs) then is that for 
these firms, the gains are less, than for firms with less pre-listing agency costs. Thus, it may not be the case that dual-
class share firms gain more than single-class share firms from legal bonding upon cross-listing. 
19 Durnev and Kim (2005) classify dual-class share firms as those whose control/voting rights exceed cash flow 
rights by at least 10%. Since I do not have access to ownership data, I am unable to perform a similar exercise.   
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 The second measure of corporate governance, also sourced from Worldscope, is the number of 
shares held by insiders as a percentage of the total number of shares outstanding. Firms with a larger 
percentage of closely held shares (as a percentage of total common shares outstanding) are likely to suffer 
less from agency conflicts since the incentives of the controlling insiders are likely to better aligned with 
those of non-controlling minority outsiders. Consistent with this view, Mitton (2002) and Claessens et al. 
(2002) show how firm profitability and firm value is greater the larger the ownership (cash-flow) stake 
held by controlling insiders. Using the liberalization of the Korean equity market in 1992, Bae and Goyal 
(2010) show that better-governed Korean firms (i.e. non-Chaebol affiliated; dividend paying; and/or firms 
where the ownership stake of the largest shareholder is large) enjoy the largest value gains from stock 
market liberalizations.  
 I employ Tobin’s q to measure firm value, where Tobin’s q is defined as the book value of debt 
plus market capitalization divided by the book value of assets. Market value of debt is proxied using its 
book value counterpart, and the replacement cost of assets as the book value of assets. Book value of debt 
is calculated as the book value of total assets less the book value of equity. Doidge et al., (2004, 2009), 
Gozzi et al. (2008), and Mitton and O’Connor (2011) also use Tobin’s q to proxy for firm value in their 
studies on the valuation effects of international cross-listings, internationalizations, and investability, 
respectively. All firm-level financial information is sourced from Worldscope for each year from 1980 to 
2007.  I control for firm and industry related factors commonly employed in other studies using Tobin’s q. 
I use the average (geometric) sales growth (inflation-adjusted) over the last two years and global industry q 
to account for firm and industry growth, respectively. Based upon the general industry classification codes 
provided by Worldscope, the (yearly) mean global industry q is calculated as the average q of all global 
firms within each classification.20 I use the log of sales (inflation-adjusted and in $U.S.), rather than total 
assets (given the definition of Tobin’s q) to control for firm size. Tobin’s q, sales growth, firm size, 
leverage and profitability are winsorized at the 1 and 99% tails of the distribution to remove the 
confounding effects of outliers. Finally, I exclude financial firms since these firms are more likely to be 
valued differently from non-financial firms.  
                                                 
20 The general industry classification codes are; 1 (Industrial), 2 (Utility), 3 (Transportation), 4 (Bank/Savings & 
Loan), 5 (Insurance), 6 (Other Financial).   
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 My final sample is outlined in Table 1. It comprises of 6,258 firms in total, made up of 123 cross-
listing firms, and 6,135 non-cross-listing firms, from 19 countries. These are Brazil, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Greece, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea (Republic), Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. From my original sample of countries, I 
lose all cross-listing firms from Argentina, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, and 
Sri Lanka. Of the 123 cross-listing firms, 39 trade as Level 1 issues, 25 as Level 2/3 issues, and 59 on 
Portal under Rule 144a to Qualified Institutional Buyers. Taiwan provides the largest number of cross-
listing firms (23), while Colombia, Greece, Indonesia, Poland, Thailand, and Turkey provide just one each. 
South Africa (10) provides the greatest number of Level 1 firms, Mexico (6) the most Level 2/3 firms, and 
Taiwan (21) the greatest number of Rule 144a firms.21 The largest number of non-cross-listing firms 
comes from China (1,327). Column 4 of Table 1 outline the number of cross-listing firms that were also 
previously deemed investable (CL & Inv). Column 5 does likewise for cross-listing dual-class share firms 
(CL & DC). Of the entire sample of 123 cross-listing firms, 58 (65) are also previously investable (non-
investable), and 31 (92) are also dual-class (single-class) share firms. Of the single-class (dual-class) share 
Level 1 firms, 10 (7) are investable and 13 (9) are non-investable. 10 (6) of the 16 single-class Level 2/3 
firms are investable (non-investable), while 7 (2) of the dual-class firms are investable (non-investable). 
Finally, of the 52 single-class Rule 144a firms, 20 are investable and 32 are non-investable. For dual-class 
firms, 4 are investable and 3 non-investable. Some of these numbers are small, and suggest that some of 
my findings should be interpreted with caution.            
 Together, Mexico (11) and South Africa (12) provide almost 40% of all joint cross-
listing/investable firms. Brazil (9) and Mexico (10) provide the majority of joint cross-listing/dual-class 
share firms. In the remaining columns of Table 1, I outline by cross-listing type, the number of joint 
cross-listing/investable and cross-listing/dual-class share firms. Of the 39 Level 1 firms, 17 (22) are also 
investable (non-investable) firms, and 16 (23) dual-class (single-class) share firms. 17 (8) of the Level 2/3 
firms are also investable (non-investable) firms, while 9 (16) are also dual-class (single-class) share firms. 
Finally, 24 (35) Rule 144a firms are also investable (non-investable) firms, while only 7 are dual-class firms. 
                                                 
21 In a recent paper, Boubakri et al. (2010) show that emerging market firms are less likely to choose Level 2 ADRs, 
and more likely to choose Level 1 ADRs. Since SOX, emerging market firms are more likely to choose a Rule 144a 
listing.  
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The remaining 52 are single-class share firms. Finally, column 6 presents the pre-cross-listing median value 
of closely-held shares (as a % of total shares outstanding) for all cross-listing firms by country. They 
suggest that insiders own a greater proportion of soon to be cross-listed firms in China (90.37%), 
Indonesia (90.57%) and Russia (73.70%). Inside ownership of cross-listing firms tends to be much lower 
in Taiwan (15.57%) and Thailand (14.31%).        
   
3. Regression Estimates 
  In Table 2, I present regression estimates, which seeks to examine the differential effects of 
investor recognition, and legal bonding on firm value. As a precursor, I first seek to establish the existence 
or not of cross-listing premia, using two-way (time and firm) fixed effects regressions of the following 
form: 
it it it it it t i itTobin's q X Level 1 Level 2/3 +Rule 144a +Year Firm       (1) 
Where Tobin’s qit is Tobin’s q for firm i in year t, Xit is a set of firm and industry controls (sales growth, 
size, global industry q), and Level 1, Level 2/3, and Rule 144a are 0/1 cross-listing dummies of the 
specified type. Yeart and Firmi represent a full set of year and firm fixed-effects. The coefficient estimates 
are outlined in Table 2, with standard errors robust to clustering at the firm level reported in parentheses 
underneath the coefficient estimates.22 One drawback with using firm-fixed effects is that the transitory 
changes in firm value (see Figure 1) around the time of listing are ignored.23 To try and alleviate some of 
these concerns, I present two sets of estimates. In column 1, I estimate Eq. (1), where the cross-listing 
dummies equal one in the year of listing and one thereafter (and zero if the firm cross-delists). In column 
2, I do likewise, but now the cross-listing dummies first equal one in the year immediately prior to cross-
listing and one thereafter (and zero if the firm cross-delists). The coefficient estimates presented in 
                                                 
22 I also estimate Eq. (1) with standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity (and not clustering), and with standard 
errors clustered by country, and find that my results are qualitatively unchanged. The standard errors, robust only to 
heteroscedasticity are much smaller, resulting in much larger t-statistics. The fact that the standard errors (without 
clustering) even given the inclusion of fixed effects are much smaller lends support for clustering the standard errors. 
The difference between the standard errors with firm fixed effects and clustering and with firm fixed effects without 
clustering likely reflects the fact that the firm effect is not fixed, but decays over time. In this instance, the firm fixed 
effects do not fully capture the within-cluster dependence in the error terms (Petersen, 2009). Hence, even given the 
inclusion of firm fixed-effects, I also cluster by firm. The time fixed effects help to absorb the time effect, thus 
accounting for the correlation in observations in the same time (year) period.  An alternative approach would be to 
cluster in both dimensions i.e., firm and time (Thompson, 2011).    
23 In Figure 1, I plot the time-series behavior of Tobin’s q around the time of cross-listing. They depict the now well-
documented behavior of firm value around the time of cross-listing (see Gozzi et al., 2008; Sarkissian and Schill, 
2009b); value increases in the period prior to becoming investable, peaks on the list year, and falls-off thereafter.  
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columns 1 and 2 suggest that only Level 2/3 firms enjoy a cross-listing premium. The coefficient is large 
(for example, relative to the coefficient estimates presented in Doidge et al. (2009), it is at least 2 times 
greater), and highly significant. The existence of a cross-listing premium for Level 2/3 has been confirmed 
in a number of studies (Doidge et al., 2004, 2009; Hope et al., 2007). O’Connor (2009a) also documents a 
cross-listing premium for Level 2/3 emerging market cross-listing firms, but none for Level 1 and Rule 
144a firms. I confirm these findings here. The coefficient estimates on the Level 1 and Rule 144a firms are 
statistically indifferent to zero. This contrasts with Doidge et al. (2004, 2009) who document a cross-listing 
premium for Level 1 firms, albeit a smaller one than the premium for Level 2/3 firms. The fact that Level 
1, nor Rule 144a emerging market firms do not command a cross-listing premium is interesting, and in 
part puzzling, since while emerging market firms are more likely to cross-list, they are less likely to 
exchange cross-list i.e., choose a Level 2/3 listing (Hope et al., 2007). At least in terms of valuation, this 
decision appears to be without merit.24    
 In columns 3 and 4, I take a first look at how investor recognition impacts the cross-listing 
premium. To do so, I estimate the following, also using two-way fixed effects: 
it it it it it it i
it i it i it t i it
Tobin's q X Level 1 Level 2/3 +Rule 144a +Level 1 * Investable
Level 2/3 * Investable Rule 144a * Investable +Investable +Year Firm
    
    
                           (2) 
Where in addition to the variables defined earlier, Investableit is a 0/1 dummy which is one of the firm is 
deemed investable, and zero otherwise, and Level 1it * Investablei, Level 2/3it * Investablei, and Rule 144ait 
* Investablei, represent the interaction of the cross-listing and investable dummies. Again, I estimate two-
separate regressions. The first (column 3) regression uses cross-listing dummies, which are one on the 
cross-listing year and one thereafter. The second (column 4) uses cross-listing dummies, which are one in 
the year immediately prior to cross-listing, and one thereafter. In this specification, the sole cross-listing 
dummies and the interaction terms capture the effect of cross-listing and investor recognition on firm 
value. The sum of the sole cross-listing dummy and its interaction with the investable dummy captures the 
effect of cross-listing on the value of previously deemed investable emerging market firms. The sole cross-
listing dummies capture the effect of cross-listing for firms that were not previously deemed investable. 
For these firms, cross-listing in the U.S. potentially represents their first liberalization event. If investor 
                                                 
24 O’Connor (2009b) does show that there is some merit in this decision for non-exchange listings from low-
disclosure regimes. Cross-listing does endow these firms with a cross-listing premium.   
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recognition is important for cross-listing, then the cross-listing premium should be greatest for cross-
listing firms that were previously not investable. This is exactly what I find for Level 2/3 firms. Level 2/3 
firms that were previously not investable enjoy the largest cross-listing premium. The coefficient estimates 
are large (0.415 and 0.540) and statistically significant. In contrast, Level 2/3 firms that were previously 
investable, and for whom investors were likely to be “aware” of prior to listing, enjoy a smaller cross-
listing premium i.e. using the coefficient estimates from column 3, the effect of a Level 2/3 cross-listing 
on the value of previously investable firms is given by the sum of the sole Level 2/3 dummy plus its 
interaction with the investable term (i.e. 0.415 + (0.223) = 0.192).       
 Investor recognition does not appear to matter for Level 1 and Rule 144a firms, in the sense that 
previously deemed investable firms perform just as well as firms that were previously not investable. 
Neither Level 1 investable or non-investable firms enjoy a statistically significant cross-listing premium. 
Neither does previously non-investable Rule 144a firms, while their counterpart investable firms lose 
value. Although in the case of Rule 144a firms, the coefficient estimates are very different for investable 
and non-investable firms (-0.180 (i.e. 0.291 + (0.471) = -0.180 versus 0.291, respectively).   
 In both specifications, the coefficient estimate on the sole investable dummy is positive and 
statistically significant. This is in line with Mitton and O’Connor (2011), who uncover an “investable 
premium” for firms that become investable in emerging markets. Furthermore, the results from this paper 
suggest that cross-listing serves to add to this premium for Level 2/3 firms that were previously 
investable. In fact, the “cross-listing premium” for previously investable firms is larger than the 
“investable premium”. For previously investable firms, a Level 1 or Rule 144a listing does not add value to 
their “investable premium”.      
 In the final column of Table 2, I take a first look at how legal bonding may explain the magnitude 
of the cross-listing premia evident from column 1, by comparing the cross-listing premium for single- and 
dual-class share firms who choose a Level 2/3 listing in the U.S. To do so, I use the regression approach 
of Plumber and Troeger (2007, 2011), namely the fixed effects vector decomposition (FEVD) estimator.25 
I adopt this approach, and not the fixed-effects approach adopted earlier, since the dual-class indicator 
                                                 
25 Others that use the fixed effects vector decomposition approach are Lensink and van der Molen (2010), Davies et 
al. (2008), Andersson and Noseleit (2011), and Akhter and Daly (2009).   
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variable is time-invariant.26 The fixed effects vector decomposition approach decomposes the firm specific 
fixed effects  iFirm  into an unexplained part and a part explained by the time-invariant variables. It is 
ultimately estimated using pooled ordinary least squares (see Equation 5), which permits for the inclusion 
of time-invariant variables. It is estimated in three distinct steps. In the first step, the (firm) fixed effects 
are retrieved from a fixed-effects regression: 
    it it t i itTobin's q X Year Firm  (3) 
Second, an ordinary least squares regression of the fixed effects on the time-invariant variable(s) is 
performed: 
^
i i 2iFirm Dual-Class     
(4) 
The final step, estimated using pooled ordinary least squares includes all time-variant and invariant 
variables plus the error term from the second stage regression: 
it 1 it it it it it i
it i it i 2 i t
c 2 i it
Tobin's q X Level 1 Level 2/3 Rule 144a Level 1 * Dual Class
Level 2/3 * Dual Class Rule 144a * Dual Class Dual Class +Year
Country
       
     
    
 
(5) 
Where Dual-Classi is one if the firm is a dual-class share firm, zero otherwise (single-class), and Level 1it * 
Dual-Classi, Level 2/3it * Dual-Classi, and Rule 144ait * Dual-Classi, represent the interaction of the cross-
listing and dual-class dummies. In this specification, the sum of the sole cross-listing variable and the 
cross-listing * dual-class interaction term captures the effect of cross-listing on the value of dual-class 
firms. The sole cross-listing dummies capture the effect of cross-listing for single-class share firms. The 
coefficient estimates suggest the following.27 The most striking result which is in stark contrast to the 
predictions of the bonding hypothesis is that single- and dual-class share Level 2/3 firms enjoy 
comparable cross-listing premia. The coefficient estimate on the single Level 2/3 dummy is positive and 
statistically significant. The coefficient on the Level 2/3 * Dual-Class interaction term is indifferent to 
zero, which suggests that dual-class Level 2/3 firms experience a cross-listing premium comparable to that 
                                                 
26 The results from a series of separate fixed-effects regressions for single- and dual-class shares are in line with the 
findings that I am about to present.    
27 The coefficient estimates from the fixed effects vector decomposition regressions are qualitatively unchanged 
when I exclude country fixed-effects, since the fixed effects retrieved from Equation 3 should capture the effects of 
all time-invariant variables (see Equation 4 of Akhter and Daly (2009)). Lensink and van der Molen (2010) include 
industry fixed effects in step 3 of their single country study (i.e., they may have included country fixed effects in a 
multi-country study).     
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of single-class share firms. This finding is inconsistent with the legal bonding hypothesis, which suggests 
that poorly governed firms that exchange-cross-list i.e., (Level 2/3 ADR or Ordinary Lists) should reap 
the largest gains from cross-listing, all else equal. This is not what I find. My findings may be consistent 
with those of Hope et al. (2007). They show that exchange-listed firms that incur lower costs of adherence 
to U.S. GAAP (i.e., firms from high-disclosure regimes) reap greater valuation gains from cross-listing 
(i.e., cross-listing premium) than firms from low-disclosure regimes, despite the fact that the legal bonding 
hypothesis suggests that the later should experience the largest gains. Fresard and Salva (2010) reach some 
similar conclusions. My findings appear to be consistent with this view. While the (relative) costs of U.S. 
GAAP adherence is likely to be highest for dual-class share firms, a priori, one would expect that dual-
class share firms would reap the largest benefits. My findings suggest that the net benefits (i.e. benefits less 
costs) for dual-class firms are on a par with single-class share firms. For dual-class share firms the costs of 
cross-listing serve to reduce the benefits. The end result is that these firms do not experience a larger 
cross-listing premium compared to single-class share firms.  
 The coefficient estimate on the single dual-class share dummy variable is statistically negative, a 
result consistent with a large literature, which suggests that investors place a large discount on these firms 
(Lins, 2003; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Smart et al., 2008). Finally, in all regressions, the control variables are 
of the correct sign and statistically significant. Large firms are worth less, and firm value increases in both 
firm and industry-level growth.  
 In Tables 3 and 4, I present a series of alternative estimates of the impact of investor recognition 
and legal bonding on the cross-listing premium, respectively. In Table 3, I present, along with the fixed 
effects estimates presented in Table 2, pooled ordinary least squares, random effects, pooled ordinary least 
squares with Mundlak (1978) correct terms (i.e., the time-averages (by firm) of the time-variant 
explanatory variables as additional regressors), and Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions which examine the 
impact of investor recognition on the cross-listing premium.28 In Table 4, I supplement the fixed-effects 
vector decomposition estimates which examine the impact of legal bonding on the cross-listing premium, 
by also presenting alternative estimates, which allow for the inclusion of time-invariant variables (i.e., the 
dual-class dummy variable). Like Table 3, these are pooled ordinary least squares with and without 
                                                 
28 The Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions are performed in STATA using the two-step procedure written by Hoechle 
(2007).     
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Mundlak (1978) terms, random effects, and Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions.29 In their paper, Doidge et 
al. (2009) also present firm-fixed effects, pooled ordinary least squares, and Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
regressions. Like them, I present two sets of pooled ordinary least squares estimates; where in both the 
standard errors are adjusted for clustering on firms. In the first set of estimates, presented in column 2 of 
both Tables 3 and 4, I regress Tobin’s q on the post-listing cross-listing dummies, the firm-level controls, 
and with time and country fixed effects included. In the second set of estimates, presented in column 3 of 
Tables 3 and 4, I now include a full set of pre-listing cross-listing dummies which equal one in all years 
prior to firms cross-listing in the U.S. I do so since in column 2 of Tables 3 and 4, we do not control for 
any unobserved heterogeneity which may well manifest in valuation differences between cross-listing and 
non-cross-listing firms. Since these differences are also likely to be evident prior to listing, the coefficient 
estimates presented in columns 2 are likely to reflect both the effects of (uncontrolled for) unobserved 
heterogeneity and the cross-listing effect itself (if there is one). In effect, by including pre-listing cross-
listing dummies, and then by testing whether the pre- and post-listing dummies are statistically different 
from one another, we can separate the effects of unobserved heterogeneity from the listing event itself on 
firm value.30 The pooled ordinary least squares estimates with Mundlak (1978) correction terms included 
are also intended to perform a similar role.  
 The coefficient estimates suggest the following. First, the coefficient estimates presented in Table 
3 are in line with those presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2. Across all specifications, the coefficient 
estimate on the sole Level 2/3 dummy variable is large, positive, and statistically significant. The 
coefficient estimates range from 0.250 in the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions to 0.493 in the first set of 
pooled ordinary least squares estimates. The firm fixed-effects (0.415), random effects (0.456), and pooled 
ordinary least squares estimates with Mundlak (1978) correct times are slightly lower (0.431). In column 3, 
the coefficient estimates on the Level 2/3 and Level 2/3 Pre dummies are not statistically significant, 
although the difference between the two (which is large and positive) is. Together, these estimates suggest 
that previously non-investable firms experience large cross-listing premia. These findings are in line with 
Merton’s (1987) recognition hypothesis. Next, and also consistent with the coefficient estimates presented 
                                                 
29 Even though a Hausman (1978) test suggests the use of fixed over random effects, I present random effects 
estimates since they allow for the inclusion of time-invariant variables.   
30 The F-stats are presented in the remaining rows of both Tables 3 and 4. 
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in Table 2, previously investable firms, of which institutional investors are likely to be aware of, experience 
a smaller cross-listing premium. In four of the six specifications, the coefficient estimate on the Level 2/3 
* Investable interaction is statistically negative (They range from -0.223 to -0.598), but in general, the sum 
of the sole Level 2/3 dummy and the interaction of the Level 2/3/Investable dummy is positive. For 
previously investable Level 2/3 firms, cross-listing does result in a cross-listing premium, but less than 
that of previously non-investable firms. In summary, the coefficient estimates presented in Table 3 are in 
line with the predictions of Merton’s (1987) recognition hypothesis. Previously non-investable Level 2/3 
firms, for whom institutional investors are unlikely to be aware of, enjoy a large positive cross-listing 
premium. Previously investable firms experience smaller cross-listing premia.   
 In Table 4, I present alternative estimates of the impact of legal bonding on the cross-listing 
premium. For comparison purposes, I also present the fixed effects vector decomposition estimates from 
Table 2. The coefficient estimates are in line with those presented in Table 2, and confirm that single- and 
dual-class Level 2/3 firms enjoy comparable cross-listing premia. The coefficient estimates on the sole 
Level 2/3 dummy variable range from 0.235 to a high of 0.422. In all specifications, the coefficient 
estimates on the Level 2/3 * Dual-Class interaction term is statistically indifferent to zero, suggesting that 
a Level 2/3 cross-listing in the U.S. results in a comparable cross-listing premium for single- and dual-class 
firms. The net benefits of cross-listing in the U.S. are the same for both.  
 In Table 5, I present alternative tests of the legal bonding hypothesis. Specifically, I present a 
series of firm fixed-effects regressions for firms with above- or below-median closely held shares (as a % 
of total common shares outstanding). Here, I seek to examine whether cross-listing firms with above- or 
below median corporate governance experience differing value effects (i.e. cross-listing premia) once they 
cross-listing. Hence, cross-listing firms are classified as either having above- or below median closely held 
shares (as a % of total common shares outstanding) based on their pre-listing levels of closely-held shares. 
A priori, the bonding hypothesis would predict that less well-governed firms (firms with below-median 
pre-listing closely-held shares as a % of total common shares outstanding) would enjoy the largest cross-
listing premia. This is what I find. In particular, I find that only poorly-governed firms who choose a Level 
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2/3 cross-listing in the U.S. enjoy a statistically significant cross-listing premia.31 In contrast, better-
governed Level 2/3 firms do not. For them, the coefficient estimate on the Level 2/3 dummy is positive, 
but statistically indifferent to zero. Interestingly, I find that better-governed Rule 144a firms enjoy a large 
cross-listing premia. This finding is consistent with those of Pinegar and Ravichandran (2010). They find 
that reputable high quality Rule 144a firms do experience cross-listing premia.  
 In Tables 6 and 7, I examine the joint effects of investor recognition and legal bonding on the 
cross-listing premium. In Table 6, I re-estimate Eq. (2) but now for single- and dual-class cross-listing 
firms separately.32 In Table 7, I also re-estimate Eq. (2), but now for firms with above- or below-median 
closely-held shares (as a % of total common shares outstanding). From Table 2, we know that single- and 
dual-class share Level 2/3 firms enjoy comparable cross-listing premia, and that previously non-investable 
Level 2/3 firms experience a larger cross-listing premium than do previously investable Level 2/3 firms. 
Here in Table 6, I now examine whether the cross-listing premia for single- and dual-class share Level 2/3 
firms differs depending on whether the firms were previously investable or not. The results for single-class 
share firms are presented in columns 1-4 of Table 6. In the remaining columns of Table 6, I present the 
results using dual-class share firms.   
 The coefficient estimates presented in Table 6 again highlight the importance of investor 
recognition in explaining cross-listing premia. Single- and dual-class share Level 2/3 firms that were 
previously investable do enjoy cross-listing premia. However, for both, the premia is less than the cross-
listing premia for Level 2/3 firms that were not previously investable. For single-class Level 2/3 firms, the 
coefficient estimates on the sole Level 2/3 dummy (which captures the cross-listing premium for 
previously non-investable firms) ranges from 0.453 to 0.458, and are statistically significant in all 
specifications. The average coefficient estimate for these firms is 0.455. The cross-listing premium for 
previously investable firms is lower. For these firms, the cross-listing premium ranges from a low of 0.224 
(0.458 plus -0.234) to a high of 0.242 (0.456 plus -0.214), with an average coefficient estimate of 0.233. 
These firms enjoy cross-listing premia, but they are less than those of previously non-investable firms. For 
                                                 
31 The coefficient estimate on the sole Level 2/3 dummy (i.e. previously non-investable) for well-governed firms is 
large and marginally statistically insignificant.   
32 Each regression includes all non-cross-listing firms and either single/dual-class share cross-listing firms.   
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single-class share Level 1 and Rule 144a firms, there are no cross-listing premia, regardless of their prior 
investable status.  
 I reach similar conclusions for dual-class share Level 2/3 firms as I do for their single-class 
counterparts. Again, previously non-investable firms enjoy the largest cross-listing premia. The coefficient 
estimates on the sole Level 2/3 dummy range from 0.355 to a high of 0.388, with an average coefficient 
estimate of 0.367. For previously investable firms, the listing premia are lower, ranging from 0.135 (0.355 
plus -0.220) to a high of 0.258 (0.370 plus -0.112), with an average coefficient estimate of 0.224. Finally, 
and again consistent with the findings for single-class share firms, for dual-class share Level 1 and Rule 
144a firms, there are no cross-listing premia, regardless of their prior investable status.  
 The findings in Table 7 are in line with those revealed in Table 6 in the sense that Level 2/3 firms 
that were previously non-investable enjoy the largest cross-listing premia. However, in contrast to the 
findings presented in Table 6, but in line with the findings outlined earlier in Table 5, again only poorly-
governed Level 2/3 firms enjoy cross-listing premia. In turn, cross-listing premia are greater for poorly-
governed Level 2/3 firms who were previously non-investable. For previously investable firms, the cross-
listing premium is lower, but positive and statistically significant nonetheless (0.487 versus 0.232 (0.487-
0.256). Finally, Table 7 reveals that it is only well-governed previously non-investable Rule 144a firms that 
enjoy a cross-listing premium.          
 The findings can be summarized as follows. First, my tests of the legal bonding hypothesis reveal 
mixed findings. When I classify cross-listing firms as dual- or single-class share firms, I find cross-listing 
premia for both, but in contrast to the predictions of the legal bonding hypothesis, the magnitude of the 
premia are the same for both. The legal bonding hypothesis would predict larger premia for dual-class 
share firms. However, when I measure the extent of insider ownership in cross-listing firms, I do find 
support for the bonding hypothesis; poorly-governed firms (i.e. Level 2/3 firms with below-median pre-
listing levels of closely-held shares as a % of total common shares outstanding) enjoy large cross-listing 
premia. Better-governed firms do not. Second, I find that bonding alone is sufficient to generate cross-
listing premia for emerging market firms cross-listing as Level 2/3 ADRs in the U.S. For previously 
investable single- and dual-class share Level 2/3 firms, for whom the majority of the cross-listing 
premium is likely to be derived from legal bonding, and not investor recognition, cross-listing does 
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enhance the value of these firms. For dual-class share firms, my findings are consistent with those of King 
and Segal (2009). They show that for a sample of Canadian dual-class firms, an exchange cross-listing in 
the U.S. results in a cross-listing premium even absent an expansion in the firm’s shareholder base. In 
contrast, single-class share Canadian firms must attract and maintain a wider shareholder base to also gain 
from cross-listing in the U.S. Here, in this paper, I find that single-class share emerging market firms need 
not do so. For them, bonding alone is sufficient to generate a cross-listing premium. This is likely to be 
the case since single-class share emerging market firms are, compared to their Canadian counterparts, 
likely to derive greater legal bonding benefits. When I classify firms by pre-listing level of closely-held 
shares, I find that bonding alone is sufficient to deliver a cross-listing premium for poorly-governed Level 
2/3 firms.    
 Third, previously non-investable firms single- and dual class share Level 2/3 firms, and Level 2/3 
firms with below-median closely-held shares (as a % of total common shares outstanding) enjoy the 
largest cross-listing premia. These findings are consistent with Merton’s (1987) recognition hypothesis. 
These findings also show how bonding and greater recognition together explain cross-listing premia. 
Bonding alone is sufficient to deliver cross-listing premia for single- and dual-class Level 2/3 firms, and 
for poorly-governed Level 2/3 firms (as measured using pre-listing levels of closely-held-shares). Bonding 
and greater recognition results in even larger listing premia.    
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 In this paper, I seek to examine whether the legal bonding and/or the recognition hypotheses can 
explain the cross-listing premia documented for Level 2/3 emerging market firms (see O’Connor (2009), 
and Smirnova (2008)). To evaluate the effects of legal bonding on firm value, I perform two separate tests. 
In the first, I follow King and Segal (2009) and estimate the effects of cross-listing on the value of single 
and dual-class firms. Since dual-class share firms have potentially the most to gain from legal bonding as 
theory predicts, I would then expect to find the largest cross-listing premia for these firms (relative to 
single-class share firms). In the second set of tests, I classify cross-listing firms by their pre-listing level of 
closely-held shares (as a % of total common shares outstanding) and estimate separate regressions for 
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cross-listing firms with above- and below-median pre-listing levels of insider ownership. I deem firms with 
below-median pre-listing median levels of closely-held shares to be poorly-governed.  
 My approach to examining the effects of greater recognition upon cross-listing differs from both 
King and Segal (2009) and Foerster and Karolyi (1999). I deem previously non-investable firms as firms 
that U.S. investors are likely to be “unaware” of pre-listing. Hence, U.S. investors are likely to become 
“aware” of these non-investable firms once they cross-list. In turn, these firms are likely to experience the 
greatest increase in their shareholder base and hence larger cross-listing premia once they cross-list.   
 I find that cross-listing premia are explained by the legal bonding and investor recognition 
hypotheses. Single- and dual-class Level 2/3 firms witness cross-listing premia, regardless of their prior 
investable status. For previously investable firms, bonding alone is sufficient to deliver a cross-listing 
premium. For previously non-investable firms, cross-listing premia are much larger, both for single- and 
dual-class firms. In subsequent analysis, I also show that the listing premium is greatest for the former. I 
also find that cross-listing premia tend to be greatest for poorly-governed Level 2/3 firms that were 
previously non-investable. Using the closely-held share measure to gauge the quality of corporate 
governance in cross-listing firms, I find no cross-listing premia for better-governed firms, irrespective of 
their prior investable status. Thus, in summary, while I find mixed results for the effects of legal bonding 
hypothesis, I consistently find that cross-listing premia increase in both bonding and greater recognition.  
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Table 1 
Sample Description 
The table reports summary statistics of the sample by country. # CL refers to the number of firms with ADRs that also have 
pre- and post-listing financial data. # NCL is the number of non-cross-listing firms. All information on ADRs is sourced from 
the Bank of New York, Citibank, NYSE, and NASDAQ. Investable dates are taken from the Emerging Markets Database. CL 
& Inv is the number of firms that are both cross-listed and Investable. Firms are deemed cross-listed and Investable if they 
become Investable prior to cross-listing in the U.S. CL & DC is the number of firms that are both cross-listed and dual-class 
firms. In the remaining columns, I provide the number (#) of each cross-listing type i.e., Level 1, Level 2/3, and Rule 144a, and 
the number of each that are also deemed investable, and dual-class firms. CHS ADR is the median pre-cross-listing % of shares 
held by insiders in cross-listing firms as a percentage of total common shares outstanding.        
 Sample 
Description 
Investable & 
Dual-Class 
Firms 
CHS 
ADR 
 Cross-Listing Firms, Cross-Listing & Investable and Cross-
Listing & Dual-Class Share Firms 
 #  
CL 
# 
NCL 
CL 
& 
Inv 
CL 
& 
DC 
CHS 
ADR 
Level 
1 
Level 
1 & 
Inv 
Level 
1 & 
DC 
Level 
2/3 
Level 
2/3 
& 
Inv 
Level 
2/3 
& 
DC 
Rule 
144a 
4 
Rule 
144a 
& 
Inv 
Rule 
144a 
& 
DC 
Brazil 9 200 3 9 58.08 4 1 4 3 2 3 2 0 2 
Chile 5 109 5 1 69.52 0 0 0 4 4 1 1 1 0 
China 2 1,327 0 2 90.37 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Colombia 1 15 1 1 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Greece 1 254 1 1 - 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India 17 366 4 0 26.56 1 1 0 2 0 0 14 3 0 
Indonesia 1 200 0 0 90.57 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Israel 2 75 0 0 58.40 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Korea 13 746 9 0 28.52 1 0 0 2 2 0 10 7 0 
Malaysia 5 782 4 0 55.11 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mexico 15 59 11 10 48.12 6 3 4 6 5 4 3 3 2 
Philippines 3 95 1 2 55.12 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Poland 1 109 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Portugal 2 52 0 1 42.08 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russia 4 21 0 0 73.70 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sth Africa 17 229 12 3 49.04 10 6 2 5 4 1 2 2 0 
Taiwan 23 1,009 6 1 15.57 0 0 0 2 0 0 21 6 1 
Thailand 1 352 0 0 14.31 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Turkey 1 135 1 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
 123 6,135 58 31 38.96 39 17 16 25 17 9 59 24 7 
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Table 2 
Regression estimates of the impact of investor recognition and legal bonding on the cross-listing premium 
The table reports coefficient estimates from firm fixed effects regressions in columns 1-4, and fixed effects vector 
decomposition regressions in column 5 of the impact of cross-listing on firm value with t-statistics (absolute value), adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level presented in parentheses underneath the coefficient estimates. The dependent variable is Tobin’s  q. 
Level 1, Level 2/3, and Rule 144a are dummy variables that equal 1 in each year in which the firm is cross-listed in the U.S. of 
the specified type. In columns 2 and 4, the cross-listing dummies equal one in the year before listing instead of the year of listing 
as is the case in columns 1, 3, and 5. Investable is a dummy variable that is set equal to one in years in which the firm is 
designated as investable. Dual Class is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm is a dual-class share firm, 0 otherwise. Firm 
size is measured as the log of annual sales in real $U.S. Firm growth is measured as the (geometric) average real growth in sales 
over the prior two years. Global industry q is calculated as the average q of all global firms within each industry classification. 
Also estimated but not reported are a constant, a full set of year dummies, and a full set of country dummies in column 5. 
Statistical significance is denoted by ***, **, * for the 1%, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.          
 Firm Fixed-Effects (FE) Fixed Effects 
Vector 
Decomposition 
(FEVD) 
 Cross-Listing Premia Cross-Listing Premia and Investor 
Recognition 
Cross-Listing 
Premia and Legal 
Bonding 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Level 1 
 
0.033 
(0.22) 
0.128 
(0.86) 
0.033 
(0.21) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.013 
(0.16) 
Level 2/3 
 
0.340*** 
(3.40) 
0.328*** 
(2.79) 
0.415*** 
(3.61) 
0.540*** 
(2.59) 
0.301*** 
(9.27) 
Rule 144a 
 
-0.140 
(1.34) 
-0.032 
(0.29) 
-0.103 
(0.96) 
0.291 
(1.40) 
-0.167*** 
(4.66) 
Level 1 * Investable 
 
  0.027 
(0.12) 
0.201 
(0.77) 
 
Level 2/3 * Investable 
 
  -0.223*** 
(2.69) 
-0.243 
(1.00) 
 
Rule 144a * Investable 
 
  -0.148 
(1.37) 
-0.471* 
(1.95) 
 
Investable 
 
  0.094** 
(2.18) 
0.074* 
(1.78) 
 
Level 1 * Dual Class 
 
    0.104 
(1.01) 
Level 2/3 * Dual Class 
 
    -0.020 
(0.24) 
Rule 144a * Dual Class 
 
    0.075 
(0.70) 
Dual Class 
 
    -0.166*** 
(15.20) 
Firm Size 
 
-0.093*** 
(5.48) 
-0.093*** 
(5.51) 
-0.094*** 
(5.52) 
-0.093*** 
(5.53) 
-0.094*** 
(5.55) 
Firm Growth 
 
0.814*** 
(12.61) 
0.814*** 
(12.62) 
0.814*** 
(12.61) 
0.812*** 
(12.59) 
0.895*** 
(12.60) 
Global Industry Q 
 
0.831*** 
(5.26) 
0.838*** 
(5.25) 
0.844*** 
(5.23) 
0.841*** 
(5.18) 
0.813*** 
(5.28) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Dummies No No No No Yes 
# Obs 42,238 42,238 42,238 42,238 42,238 
R-Squared 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.622 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27 
Table 3 
Alternative regression estimates of the impact of investor recognition on the cross-listing premium 
The table reports coefficient estimates from a series of regressions, which estimate the effect of investor recognition and cross-
listing on firm value. Column 1 reports coefficient estimates from firm fixed effects regressions. Columns 2 & 3 reports 
coefficient estimates from pooled ordinary least squares estimates with t-stats calculated using standard errors clustered by firm 
presented underneath in brackets. Column 4 reports coefficient estimates from random effects regressions. Column 5 does 
likewise using Mundlak (1978) correction terms to account for unobserved heterogeneity, and column 6 reports coefficient 
estimates from Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions. The dependent variable is Tobin’s q. Level 1, Level 2/3, and Rule 144a are 
dummy variables that equal 1 in each year in which the firm is cross-listed in the U.S. of the specified type. Investable is a 
dummy variable that is set equal to one in years in which the firm is designated as investable. The firm-level controls are defined 
in the main text. The bottom panel reports a set of F-stats related to coefficient estimates presented in column 3. Also estimated 
but not reported are a constant, a full set of year dummies, and a full set of country dummies. Statistical significance is denoted 
by ***, **, * for the 1%, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.     
 Fixed Effects 
(FE) 
 
Pooled Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(POLS) 
Random 
Effects 
(RE) 
Mundlak 
(1978) 
Fama-
MacBeth 
(1973)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Level 1 
 
0.033 
(0.21) 
0.243* 
(2.03) 
-0.070 
(0.62) 
0.077 
(0.56) 
-0.082 
(0.51) 
0.165* 
(1.92) 
Level 2/3 
 
0.415*** 
(3.61) 
0.493* 
(1.85) 
0.941 
(1.33) 
0.456*** 
(4.19) 
0.431*** 
(3.50) 
0.250** 
(2.60) 
Rule 144a 
 
-0.103 
(0.96) 
0.035 
(0.46) 
-0.033 
(0.32) 
-0.061 
(0.70) 
-0.153 
(1.42) 
-0.101** 
(2.27) 
Level 1 * Investable 
 
0.027 
(0.12) 
0.300 
(1.02) 
0.681*** 
(3.43) 
0.038 
(0.16) 
0.286 
(1.10) 
0.213** 
(2.72) 
Level 2/3 * Investable 
 
-0.223*** 
(2.69) 
-0.598** 
(2.16) 
-0.785 
(1.13) 
-0.269*** 
(3.21) 
-0.508* 
(1.77) 
-0.052 
(0.74) 
Rule 144a * Investable 
 
-0.148 
(1.37) 
-0.153 
(1.43) 
0.058 
(0.47) 
-0.154 
(1.48) 
-0.136 
(1.39) 
0.100*** 
(2.85) 
Investable 
 
0.094** 
(2.18) 
0.350*** 
(5.54) 
0.315*** 
(5.12) 
0.128*** 
(3.11) 
0.150*** 
(3.38) 
0.092*** 
(3.49) 
Level 1 (Pre) 
 
  0.120 
(0.54) 
   
Level 2/3 (Pre) 
 
  0.225 
(0.65) 
   
Rule 144a (Pre) 
 
  0.078 
(0.61) 
   
Level 1 * Investable (Pre) 
 
  -0.319 
(1.15) 
   
Level 2/3 * Investable (Pre) 
 
  0.319 
(0.60) 
   
Rule 144a * Investable (Pre)  
 
  0.157 
(0.83) 
   
Firm Size 
 
-0.094*** 
(5.52) 
-0.058*** 
(6.83) 
-0.060*** 
(6.87) 
-0.086*** 
(9.16) 
-0.093*** 
(5.59) 
-0.019 
(1.15) 
Firm Growth 
 
0.814*** 
(12.61) 
1.206*** 
(16.74) 
1.207*** 
(16.79) 
0.901*** 
(15.53) 
0.800*** 
(12.30) 
1.045*** 
(6.00) 
Global Industry Q 
 
0.844*** 
(5.23) 
0.935*** 
(6.00) 
0.864*** 
(5.50) 
0.863*** 
(5.62) 
0.631*** 
(3.86) 
0.713*** 
(3.44) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Country Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Obs 42,238 42,238 42,238 42,238 42,238 42,238 
R-Squared 0.010 0.129 0.131 0.117 0.167 0.243 
 F-Stats 
Level 1: Pre vs. Post   1.07    
Level 2/3: Pre vs. Post   4.96**    
Rule 144a: Pre vs. Post   0.33    
Level 1 INV: Pre vs. Post   6.12***    
Level 2/3 INV: Pre vs. Post   0.85    
Rule 144a INV: Pre vs. Post   0.64    
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Table 4 
Alternative regression estimates of the impact of legal bonding on the cross-listing premium 
The table reports coefficient estimates from a series of regressions, which estimate the effect of corporate governance and 
cross-listing on firm value. Column 1 reports coefficient estimates from Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition (FEVD) 
regressions. Columns 2 & 3 report coefficient estimates from pooled ordinary least squares estimates with t-stats calculated 
using standard errors clustered by firm presented underneath in brackets. Column 4 reports coefficient estimates from random 
effects regressions. Column 5 does likewise using Mundlak (1978) correction terms to account for unobserved heterogeneity, 
and column 6 reports coefficient estimates from Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions. The dependent variable is Tobin’s q. Level 
1, Level 2/3, and Rule 144a are dummy variables that equal 1 in each year in which the firm is cross-listed in the U.S. of the 
specified type. Dual Class is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm is a dual-class share firm, 0 otherwise. The firm-level 
controls are defined in the main text. The bottom panel reports a set of F-stats related to coefficient estimates presented in 
column 3. Also estimated but not reported are a constant, a full set of year dummies, and a full set of country dummies. 
Statistical significance is denoted by ***, **, * for the 1%, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.     
 Fixed 
Effects VD 
(FEVD) 
Pooled Ordinary Least 
Squares 
(POLS) 
Random 
Effects 
(RE) 
Mundlak 
(1978) 
Fama-
MacBeth 
(1973)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Level 1 
 
-0.013 
(0.16) 
0.486*** 
(2.77) 
0.500*** 
(2.84) 
0.020 
(0.10) 
0.142 
(0.79) 
0.570*** 
(3.01) 
Level 2/3 
 
0.301*** 
(9.27) 
0.383 
(1.20) 
0.394 
(1.23) 
0.422*** 
(4.12) 
0.329* 
(1.85) 
0.235*** 
(2.95) 
Rule 144a 
 
-0.167*** 
(4.66) 
0.023 
(0.32) 
0.031 
(0.42) 
-0.117 
(1.30) 
-0.154 
(1.50) 
-0.016 
(0.70) 
Level 1 * Dual Class 
 
0.104 
(1.01) 
-0.190 
(0.71) 
-0.185 
(0.68) 
0.156 
(0.62) 
-0.225 
(0.85) 
-0.374* 
(1.93) 
Level 2/3 * Dual Class 
 
-0.020 
(0.24) 
0.035 
(0.10) 
0.049 
(0.14) 
-0.117 
(0.59) 
0.044 
(0.13) 
-0.013 
(0.30) 
Rule 144a * Dual Class 
 
0.075 
(0.70) 
0.262* 
(1.84) 
0.277** 
(1.96) 
0.204 
(0.72) 
0.218 
(1.47) 
0.128*** 
(3.17) 
Dual Class 
 
-0.166*** 
(15.20) 
-0.173*** 
(5.00) 
-0.179*** 
(5.19) 
-0.197*** 
(5.23) 
-0.143*** 
(4.16) 
0.137 
(1.39) 
Level 1 (Pre) 
 
  0.425** 
(2.24) 
   
Level 2/3 (Pre) 
 
  -0.193 
(1.34) 
   
Rule 144a (Pre) 
 
  0.184 
(1.63) 
   
Level 1 * Dual Class (Pre) 
 
  0.045 
(0.13) 
   
Level 2/3 * Dual Class (Pre)  
 
  0.381 
(1.24) 
   
Rule 144a * Dual Class (Pre) 
 
  0.121 
(0.49) 
   
Firm Size 
 
-0.094*** 
(5.55) 
-0.050*** 
(5.76) 
-0.052*** 
(5.87) 
-0.084*** 
(8.86) 
-0.092*** 
(5.50) 
-0.010 
(0.23) 
Firm Growth 
 
0.895*** 
(12.60) 
1.173*** 
(16.34) 
1.169*** 
(16.35) 
0.893*** 
(15.42) 
0.800*** 
(12.36) 
0.975*** 
(5.75) 
Global Industry Q 
 
0.813*** 
(5.28) 
0.967*** 
(6.19) 
0.934*** 
(5.97) 
0.855*** 
(5.65) 
0.615*** 
(3.67) 
0.723*** 
(3.52) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Obs 42,238 42,238 42,238 42,238 42,238 42,238 
R-Squared 0.622 0.127 0.129 0.117 0.136 0.253 
 F-Stats 
Level 1: Pre vs. Post   5.01***    
Level 2/3: Pre vs. Post   4.24**    
Rule 144a: Pre vs. Post   1.35    
Level 1 DC: Pre vs. Post   0.35    
Level 2/3 DC: Pre vs. Post   0.87    
Rule 144a DC: Pre vs. Post   2.19    
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Table 5 
Regression estimates of the impact of legal bonding on the cross-listing premium  
The table reports coefficient estimates from firm fixed effects regressions with t-statistics (absolute value), adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level presented in parentheses underneath the coefficient estimates. The dependent variable is Tobin’s  q. 
Level 1, Level 2/3, and Rule 144a are dummy variables that equal 1 in each year in which the firm is cross-listed in the U.S. of 
the specified type. Seperate regressions are estimated for firms with above- and below-median closely-held shares (as a % of 
total common shares outstanding). Firm size is measured as the log of annual sales in real $U.S. Firm growth is measured as the 
(geometric) average real growth in sales over the prior two years. Global industry q is calculated as the average q of all global 
firms within each industry classification. Also estimated but not reported is full set of year dummies. Statistical significance is 
denoted by ***, **, * for the 1%, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.          
 Closely Held Shares (as a % of Total Shares Outstanding) 
 Above-Median Below-Median 
Level 1 
 
0.168 
(0.75) 
-0.055 
(0.28) 
Level 2/3 
 
0.238 
(1.24) 
0.412*** 
(3.03) 
Rule 144a 
 
0.259** 
(2.23) 
-0.234* 
(1.80) 
Firm Size 
 
-0.030 
(1.18) 
-0.128*** 
(5.39) 
Firm Growth 
 
0.792*** 
(6.82) 
0.917*** 
(10.23) 
Global Industry Q 
 
0.638*** 
(3.46) 
1.073*** 
(4.47) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes 
# Obs 14,740 14,765 
R-Squared 0.014 0.010 
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Table 6 
Regression estimates of the joint impact of investor recognition and legal bonding on the cross-listing premium 
The table reports coefficient estimates from firm fixed effects regressions of the impact of cross listing on firm value with t-
statistics (absolute value), adjusted for clustering at the firm level presented in parentheses underneath the coefficient estimates. 
The dependent variable is Tobin’s q. Separate regressions are reported for single- and dual-class cross-listing firms. Level 1, 
Level 2/3, and Rule 144a are dummy variables that equal 1 in each year in which the firm is cross-listed in the U.S. of the 
specified type. Investable is a dummy variable that is set equal to one in years in which the firm is designated as investable. Firm 
size is measured as the log of annual sales in real $U.S. Firm growth is measured as the (geometric) average real growth in sales 
over the prior two years. Global industry q is calculated as the average q of all global firms within each industry classification. 
Also estimated but not reported are a constant, and a full set of year dummies. Statistical significance is denoted by ***, **, * for 
the 1%, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.          
 Single & Dual-Class Share Firms 
 Single-Class Share Cross-Listing Firms Dual-Class Share Cross-Listing Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Level 1 
 
-0.143 
(0.54) 
-0.131 
(0.50) 
-0.117 
(0.45) 
-0.106 
(0.41) 
0.223 
(1.30) 
0.212 
(1.26) 
0.186 
(1.13) 
0.194 
(1.18) 
Level 2/3 
 
0.453*** 
(3.84) 
0.456*** 
(3.85) 
0.454*** 
(4.08) 
0.458*** 
(4.09) 
0.355 
(1.54) 
0.370 
(1.61) 
0.388* 
(1.74) 
0.355* 
(1.68) 
Rule 144a 
 
-0.182 
(1.51) 
-0.168 
(1.41) 
-0.142 
(1.23) 
-0.138 
(1.20) 
0.117 
(0.42) 
0.121 
(0.44) 
0.113 
(0.42) 
0.118 
(0.44) 
Level 1 * Investable 
 
0.191 
(0.51) 
0.187 
(0.50) 
0.192 
(0.50) 
0.193 
(0.50) 
-0.179 
(0.68) 
-0.167 
(0.64) 
-0.157 
(0.64) 
-0.156 
(0.64) 
Level 2/3 * Investable 
 
-0.214** 
(2.06) 
-0.214** 
(2.07) 
-0.226** 
(2.09) 
-0.234** 
(2.16) 
-0.105 
(1.05) 
-0.112 
(1.11) 
-0.135 
(1.40) 
-0.220** 
(2.42) 
Rule 144a * Investable 
 
-0.114 
(0.94) 
-0.123 
(1.01) 
-0.110 
(0.92) 
-0.110 
(0.91) 
-0.300 
(1.32) 
-0.313 
(1.39) 
-0.329 
(1.48) 
-0.330 
(1.48) 
Investable 
 
0.098** 
(2.20) 
0.100** 
(2.25) 
0.102** 
(2.30) 
0.102** 
(2.32) 
0.076* 
(1.68) 
0.077* 
(1.72) 
0.079* 
(1.78) 
0.080* 
(1.80) 
Firm Size 
 
 -0.036** 
(2.33) 
-0.091*** 
(5.28) 
-0.091*** 
(5.30) 
 -0.035** 
(2.29) 
-0.092*** 
(5.28) 
-0.092*** 
(5.31) 
Firm Growth 
 
  0.800*** 
(12.34) 
0.801*** 
(12.34) 
  0.798*** 
(12.26) 
0.799*** 
(12.28) 
Global Industry Q 
 
   0.799*** 
(4.63) 
   0.809*** 
(4.77) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# Obs 41,770 41,770 41,770 41,770 41,133 41,133 41,133 41,133 
R-Squared 0.020 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.020 0.010 0.010 0.010 
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Table 7 
Regression estimates of the impact of legal bonding and investor recognition on the cross-listing premium  
The table reports coefficient estimates from firm fixed effects regressions with t-statistics (absolute value), adjusted for 
clustering at the firm level presented in parentheses underneath the coefficient estimates. The dependent variable is Tobin’s q. 
Level 1, Level 2/3, and Rule 144a are dummy variables that equal 1 in each year in which the firm is cross-listed in the U.S. of 
the specified type. Seperate regressions are estimated for firms with above- and below-median closely-held shares (as a % of 
total common shares outstanding). Investable is a dummy variable that is set equal to one in years in which the firm is 
designated as investable. Firm size is measured as the log of annual sales in real $U.S. Firm growth is measured as the 
(geometric) average real growth in sales over the prior two years. Global industry q is calculated as the average q of all global 
firms within each industry classification. Also estimated but not reported is full set of year dummies. Statistical significance is 
denoted by ***, **, * for the 1%, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.          
 Closely Held Shares (as a % of Total Shares Outstanding) 
 Above-Median Below-Median 
Level 1 
 
0.229 
(0.83) 
-0.095 
(0.47) 
Level 2/3 
 
0.302 
(1.61) 
0.487*** 
(2.89) 
Rule 144a 
 
0.243** 
(2.09) 
-0.198 
(1.39) 
Level 1 * Investable 
 
-0.271 
(1.08) 
0.148 
(0.51) 
Level 2/3 * Investable 
 
-0.219 
(1.50) 
-0.256** 
(2.42) 
Rule 144a * Investable 
 
-0.017 
(0.05) 
-0.126 
(1.09) 
Investable 
 
0.176** 
(2.36) 
0.012 
(0.25) 
Firm Size 
 
-0.029 
(1.16) 
-0.129*** 
(5.39) 
Firm Growth 
 
0.784*** 
(6.72) 
0.918*** 
(10.17) 
Global Industry Q 
 
0.634*** 
(3.54) 
1.100*** 
(4.62) 
Time Dummies Yes Yes 
# Obs 14,740 14,765 
R-Squared 0.017 0.010 
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Value of cross-listing firms in event time 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1: The figure displays the mean and median value of Level 1, Level 2/3, and Rule 144a firms in event (cross-
listing) time. The event period ranges from three years prior to three years post-listing. Year “0” is the cross-listing 
year. Tobin’s q is used to measure firm value, where Tobin’s q is defined as the book value of debt plus market 
capitalization divided by the book value of assets. Market value of debt is proxied using its book value counterpart, 
and the replacement cost of assets as the book value of assets. Book value of debt is calculated as the book value of 
total assets less the book value of equity. All information on cross-listed firms is sourced from the Bank of New 
York, and cross-referenced with information from Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan, the New York Stock Exchange, and 
NASDAQ.      
 
